Insights

Nobody Targeted You. Somebody Sold You.

August 26, 2026 • James Gort

By James Gort. Originally published on LinkedIn on August 26, 2026.

A federal advisory updated this month lists the industries a ransomware group has hit. Legal is on it, right between medical and insurance.

On August 18, three federal agencies updated a warning about a ransomware operation called Medusa. The FBI, CISA, and the Department of Health and Human Services now count more than 500 organizations hit, up from a little over 300 in the previous version of the same advisory.

Most business owners will read the phrase "critical infrastructure" in that warning and stop there. Power plants. Hospital systems. Defense contractors. Not us.

Then you get to the list of industries the agencies actually name. Medical. Education. Legal. Insurance. Technology. Manufacturing.

Legal sits in the middle of that list, in a federal advisory, alongside the sectors everyone assumes this kind of thing is about.

The part that should change how you think about it

The instinct, when you see a warning like this, is to ask why anyone would come after a firm your size.

The answer in the advisory is that nobody did.

Medusa runs on an affiliate model. The people who break in and the people who deploy the ransomware are frequently not the same people. The operators buy access from brokers who found it first, and the agencies note those brokers are paid anywhere from a hundred dollars to a million, depending on what they are selling.

A hundred dollars. Less than you would spend taking a client to lunch.

Nobody sat in a room and decided your firm was worth attacking. Somebody found a way in, packaged it, and sold it to whoever wanted it. Your name, your practice areas, and your headcount were not part of the decision, because there was no decision to be part of.

That should be a small relief and a serious problem at the same time. It is not personal. It also means being small, being careful, and being uninteresting were never protecting you, because none of those were ever the criteria. Reachability was.

Why this lands harder on a firm that holds other people’s confidences

Medusa uses what the agencies call double extortion. They encrypt your files so you cannot work, and they take a copy first so they can threaten to publish it if you do not pay. They run a leak site for exactly that purpose.

For most businesses, that second threat is bad. For a law firm, it is a different category of problem. The files are not yours. They are privileged material belonging to clients who handed them over on the understanding that you would protect them. Some of those clients are in active matters, with opposing parties who would find that material valuable. And you are the one making the phone calls.

The same logic runs through the rest of that federal list, whether it is patient records, policyholder files, or client financials. These are businesses whose product is other people’s trust, which is exactly what makes the leak threat work.

The deadline does not move

Here is the part that does not show up in any advisory.

You have a hearing Thursday. A filing deadline that a judge set. A statute of limitations that has been running for two years. Ransomware does not generate an extension. Nobody on the other side of that deadline cares that your document management system is encrypted.

That is the real cost, and it is why these attacks work. The ransom is not the expensive part. The expensive part is the two weeks where the firm cannot function while the calendar keeps moving.

The software nobody has ever inventoried

One finding deserves particular attention, and it needs to be said carefully.

Medusa actors make heavy use of legitimate remote monitoring and management software, the same category of tool any IT provider uses to support you remotely. They favor it because it is normal. It does not look like malware, because it is not malware, and often they simply use whatever is already installed.

This is not a reason to distrust the tools your IT provider uses. It is a reason to ask a question almost no firm has asked out loud. What remote access software is on our machines right now, and does all of it belong there?

If nobody can answer, that is the gap. Not the tool.

What to actually do

The advisory is specific about how these attacks start, and every route is something a firm your size can close.

Patch anything facing the internet, and treat it as urgent. The agencies note these actors move on newly disclosed vulnerabilities quickly, sometimes within about a day of a flaw becoming public. Most small firms treat patching as monthly housekeeping. On your firewall, your VPN, and your remote access, the real window is hours.

Require multi-factor authentication on everything reachable from outside your office. It is what makes a purchased credential worthless.

Inventory your remote access software and keep that list current.

Watch for new accounts. Creating one is how these actors stay in after the original door closes.

Make sure your backups cannot be deleted by whoever holds your admin credentials. That is the first thing an attacker goes looking for.

What good looks like

A firm that has done this work is not walking around anxious. The internet-facing systems are current; someone would notice an account that appeared at two in the morning, and the recovery copies sit somewhere a stolen password cannot reach.

The attack still comes, because these campaigns are automated and indiscriminate. It just does not find an open door.

The quieter alternative

You find out on a Monday. Files encrypted, a note on the screen, and a message saying client material will be published unless you pay. The hearing is still Thursday. The client whose matter is sitting on that leak site still has to be called. And the answer to how they got in turned out to be a firewall that went months without an update on a vulnerability that was public and patchable the whole time.

Nobody chose your firm. That is exactly why the ordinary maintenance matters and why it is fixable.

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