By James Gort. Originally published on LinkedIn on August 11, 2026.
Attackers stopped treating backups as an obstacle and started treating them as the first target. Four questions that tell you where your firm actually stands.
Most business owners think about backups the same way. It is the thing that saves you if ransomware ever hits. You pay for it, you check the box, you sleep a little better.
Attackers know that too. Which is why, somewhere along the way, your backup stopped being the last thing they worried about and became the first thing they went looking for.
The ransom note is not the beginning
It is close to the end.
Verizon’s 2025 breach research puts the median time an attacker spends inside a network before anyone notices at around 24 days, for breaches the attackers did not announce themselves. That is more than three weeks of quiet access. They are not idle during it. They are learning your environment, collecting credentials, and finding the systems you would use to recover.
Mandiant’s 2025 incident response work documents the pattern directly, including an investigation where the attacker destroyed the backups and then deployed the ransomware. By the time anything appeared on anyone’s screen, the recovery path had already been handled.
That is the shift worth understanding. You are not in a race that starts when the ransom note shows up. The race was run weeks earlier, and your backups were the finish line.
This is not a story about carelessness
You did the responsible thing. You bought backup, you were told it was running, and you went back to running your business. Nobody sent a notice saying the threat model had changed underneath you.
The uncomfortable part for most owners is not that they were careless. It is that they have never had a reason to find out whether the thing they are counting on would actually hold. A backup nobody has tested is a belief, not a control. In every other part of your practice, you would not accept that distinction. This is the one place it tends to slip by.
Four questions
You do not need to understand backup architecture to find out where you stand. You need honest answers to four questions, and whoever handles your IT should be able to give them without hedging.
1. If someone had your admin password today, could they delete your backups?
This is the one that matters most. In a lot of small firms, the backup system is reachable with the same credentials as everything else. If an attacker takes that account, they inherit the ability to erase your recovery along with everything else they touch. The answer you want is that deleting your backups, or quietly shortening how long they are kept, is not something that account can do at all.
2. Is your Microsoft 365 actually backed up?
Most firms assume Microsoft handles this. Microsoft keeps the service running. What lives inside your email, OneDrive, and SharePoint is your responsibility, and in a professional practice that is often where the real work sits. This gap is common enough that it deserves its own conversation.
3. Can an ordinary computer in your office reach the backups?
If your backup drive shows up as a drive letter on a workstation, then ransomware that lands on that workstation encrypts the backup right along with the files. Recovery copies should not be reachable from the machines your team uses every day.
4. When did someone last restore from it and confirm it worked?
Not confirmed that the backup job ran. Actually restored files and opened them. If nobody can remember, then the honest status of your backups is unknown, and unknown is not the same as fine.
What good looks like
A firm that has answered these is not living with a low hum of worry. It gets hit, and the day simply goes differently. The recovery copies sit somewhere the attacker could not reach even with the passwords they stole. Someone restores from a copy taken before anything went wrong. The firm loses a day, maybe two, instead of three weeks. Clients never hear about it, because there is nothing to tell them.
That is the whole goal. Not a firm that never gets attacked. A firm where an attack is an interruption instead of an emergency.
The alternative
The ransom note appears on a Monday morning. Someone goes to check the backups and finds them gone or finds that they only ever covered the file server and not the mailboxes where most of the work actually lives. Now the choice is between paying criminals who may not deliver and rebuilding from nothing, in the middle of your busiest season, while clients wait.
The four questions above take one conversation to answer. Not knowing the answers is the expensive part.